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The Iranian 2009 massive anti-regime protests in the wake of the contested 
presidential elections and the Arab Spring have taken the scholars of Middle Eastern Studies 
and the international community by surprise. It seems that, despite the very diverse outcomes 
of the uprisings in Iran and across the Arab world, Middle Eastern societies are in the very 
middle of what has been called an ‘unfinished revolution’ (Sakbani 2011). Despite the 
confusion that affected the academic community following the surprising events of the past 
few years, a great amount of studies have been produced in order to identify the roots and 
make sense of the uprisings. For the most part, however, explanations for the events refer to 
and are based on well-known theoretical debates and paradigms. In the case of the Arab 
world, the fall of long-standing authoritarian regimes has revived scholarly interest for the 
transition to democracy paradigm, whereas studies on the resilience of authoritarian regimes 
are now perceived as over-estimating authoritarian rulers’ grip on society. In addition, the 
electoral success of Islamist parties has re-ignited scholarly enthusiasm for the rather trite 
debate on the compatibility between Islam and democracy.  
In the case of Iran, similar debates centred on democratization versus authoritarian 
persistence and on the relationship among Islam, democracy and modernity have been 
animating academic discussions for the last two decades. The 2009 crisis strengthened 
2 
 
scholars’ perception of Iranian society as democratic, liberal, secular and in conflict with the 
authoritarian Islamic regime. Indeed, many social scientists of Iranian Studies support the 
idea that the explosion of political and social crisis in Iran, such as the 2009 uprising, 
demonstrates the existence of that liberal, secular and ‘modern’ civil society willing to shake 
a backward and authoritarian regime off. These four books elaborate on this interpretative 
line of inquiry, setting forth interesting arguments for an analysis of the current state of 
Iranian Studies and offering useful elements of reflection to scholars of the Arab world as 
well. 
 
The ideology of democracy in Iranian Studies 
The field of Iranian Studies is very often characterised by strong political fervour, a 
trait obviously not confined to it, yet very passionate. Many among the scholars of Iranian 
Studies are indeed engaged in promoting a culture of peace and democracy within the 
international community and Iran, thanks to their public visibility and intellectual 
discernment. However this normative mission, which is certainly compatible with scholarly 
work, has to some extent turned into a far more rigid, and in some cases even ideological, 
posture that informs scientific claims and analyses. Some traits of such an ideological stance 
are present in the books under review. This is particularly evident in the interpretation of 
Iranian national history they subscribe to, which centres on a highly symbolic idea of 
democracy, on the clear-cut separation between society and the state and on a traditional 
understanding of modernity, which is composite of a secular public sphere, liberal democracy 
and individualism. This interpretation, which has become dominant in reformist political 
circles in Iran (Khatami 2005) and among many scholars, argues that a ‘quest for democracy’ 
(Azimi, 2008) characterizes Iranian history and that Iranian civil society has been conducting 
this quest against the state throughout the centuries. The state and its authoritarian nature are 
considered the main obstacle on the path towards the establishment of a liberal and 
democratic political order.  
The first event regarded as an example of this recurring historical pattern is the 
Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911, to which many of the authors contributing to the 
books under review refer to. During those years, so the story goes, Iranians became familiar 
‘with modern thinking and the concept of democracy, associational life, modern state, rule of 
law, political participation and civil establishments such as parliament, political parties and 
civil institutions,’ (Razzaghi 2010, 3) but all hopes for the establishment of a democratic 
government were dashed due to the return of repressive monarchical rule thanks to the 
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helping hand of foreign powers. The second event highlighting the ‘quest’ and its ultimate 
failure is the experience of the Mossadegh’s government, which, in 1951, nationalised the 
Iranian oil company, raising British and American concerns and eventually leading to the 
1953 coup d’état and the restoration of Pahlavi authoritarianism, which repressed all 
dissenting voices. The 1979 revolution is also seen as crucial event on the road to democracy, 
since it represents the people’s victory over the monarchy. However, despite the great 
expectations that the revolution raised, scholars agree that the establishment of democracy 
and of the flourishing of an autonomous and modern civil society was halted when the 
Khomeinists high-jacked the revolutionary moment and its fate sealed with the breakout of 
the Iran-Iraq war. Twenty years later, the reformist Khatami’s governments (1997-2005) tried 
to partly restore democratic rule through the establishment and protection of civil society 
organisations, attempting to make them the pillars of a process of democratisation. At the 
time, the idea of civil society as an adversary of authoritarianism regained momentum 
(Rivetti 2012) and increased its strength throughout the first Ahmadinejad’s presidential term 
(2005-2009) and during the 2009 crisis.  
This narrative of national history, based on the ideas of ‘civil society resilience’ and 
‘persistent struggle for democracy’ finds significant support in political and intellectual 
circles both inside and outside of Iran. Jahanbegloo’s edited book builds explicitly on it: as he 
writes in the introduction, the core questions of the volume are  
 
‘Under what conditions do we get to talk about the role of Iranian civil society in 
the process of transition to democracy in Iran? What has been the enduring legacy 
of the previous social and political movements, starting with the Constitutional 
revolution of 1906, in the struggle for democracy in Iran? (…) Last but not least, in 
which way could we say that the work of Iranian civil society has strengthened the 
idea of secularism in Iran?’ (xiii).  
 
The book collects sixteen contributions of well-known scholars and of Iranian social 
and political activists, who offer interesting insights such as Shadi Sadr’s reading of the 
women’s movement strategy, or lack thereof, in the post-2009 environment (199-217). From 
a general point of view the volume looks more like an ‘activist book’ than an academic one. 
Indeed, its main objective is to discuss a number of issues related to democratisation and 
secularisation in Iran, contextualizing them in the historical trajectory described above. The 
first two sections of the volume (‘Theorizing Civil Society in Iran,’ 3-93 and ‘Islam, 
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Secularism, and Efforts for Democratization,’ 97-156) are aimed at understanding and 
underlining the enduring legacy of this ‘quest for democracy.’ For instance, in his chapter on 
‘Religious Disputation and Democratic Constitutionalism,’ Nader Hashemi argues that ‘the 
origins of today’s ideological conflict between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein 
Mousavi can be traced back to the Iranian Constitutional revolution of 1906-11’ (97). The 
remaining two sections (‘Gender and Politics,’ 159-217 and ‘Identity and Group Rights,’ 
219-290) deal with the (dis)respect of human rights and efforts to promote gender equality 
and minorities rights. The common thread linking all the chapters is the reference to Iranian 
secular democratic traditions, which shaped the Green Movement’s identity. In Farhad 
Khosrokhavar’s bold words, the outcome of such an influence is the fact that Iranian society 
is today divided between ‘a non-organized secularized Islamic society on the one hand, and 
anti-modern, violent, Islamist groups on the other side, backed and organized by the 
theocratic government’ (72-73). 
Ali Mirsepassi’s Democracy in Modern Iran echoes these arguments too. He refers to 
an unchanging historical pattern explaining the 2009 crisis:  
 
‘the present reform movement in Iran started shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-88), and clearly announced its aspirations to build democracy, establish 
the rule of law, and realize a society where people can live honorably as citizens. 
All these aims are consistent with the tradition of the 1906 Constitutional 
Movement. (…) (The Green Movement) must be read within the context of this 
broader historical discourse in which the struggle for democracy and the rule of law 
has been waged against both such authoritarian ideologies and political regimes’ 
(xi).  
 
At the core of Mirsepassi’s volume stands an evaluation of the likelihood of a cultural 
and political democratisation in Iran which, contrary to the optimistic and activist tone of 
Jahanbegloo’s book, is quite pessimistic. Mirsepassi focuses on Iranian intellectual milieux 
and argues that the Iranian intellectual approach to democracy is inefficient since it is 
concerned with an epistemological and philosophical perspective rather than with the 
establishment of democratic institutions for governing society as the first step to be taken in 
order to promote a democratic culture. Thus, the author criticises the much celebrated ‘new 
intellectuals of Iran’ and their supposedly democratising function (Jahanbegloo 2000) by 
stating that  
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‘the dominant intellectual perspective (…) has been philosophical, and has been in 
the tradition of philosophical rationalism. This philosophical reading of modern 
ideas and society has reduced the hold on democracy to an embrace of ‘progress,’ 
‘scientific rationality,’ and ‘reason.’ Democratic ideas and institutions have 
therefore either been seen as a by-product of modern rationality or as the absence 
of intellectual sensibilities concerning culture’ (20). 
 
Despite providing the readership with good arguments and mastering an impressive 
amount of philosophical and theoretical material, Mirsepassi’s volume does not add novel 
perspectives to debates that have already been widely discussed in the field of Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Studies. This is the case, for instance, of his discussion of the complex relation 
between democracy and secularism and of the contested nature of the idea of modernity (25-
80). Furthermore, despite supporting the idea of modernity as an ‘unfinished project’, 
Mirsepassi is quite clear in suggesting that the road to democracy for Iran has to be inspired 
by Western models of modernity and secularism, in particular by British Enlightenment and 
the Kantian liberal tradition of thought.  
 
Democratisation and Social Secularism in Iran: a Reaction to Previous Scholarship 
At the core of Jahanbegloo’s edited book and Mirsepassi’s Democracy in Modern 
Iran are the issues of democratisation and social secularism in Iran. The persistence of these 
arguments and the way in which they are approached are of course related to the peculiar 
nature of the Islamic Republic and its social transformations. But it also can be seen as a 
reaction to two historiographical trends that developed in the 1970s and 1980s within Iranian 
Studies. The first is a culturalist approach, which tends to explain social and political facts 
through the prism of religion and its social appeal; and the second is the ‘state-centric’ 
approach, which understands Iranian ‘history through the ideologies, institutions, and 
personalities that dominate a given society’ (Matin-Asgari 2002, 3; Schayegh 2010). In post-
1979 Iran these two perspectives have merged. This has determined among the scholars of 
Iranian Studies, many of whom are of Iranian origin and lived personally part of the 
revolutionary events, the understandable will of reacting to a representation of Iran as a 
religiously dominated, politically static and socially backward country. Indeed, as Afshin 
Matin-Asgari noted (2002), mainstream historiography has for years depicted the history of 
modern Iran as characterised by a struggle between the state and the Shiite clergy, apparently 
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the two only existing political and social forces in the country. This is why, according to Said 
Amir Arjomand (1988) or Ira Lapidus (1988), the only possible outcome of the 1979 
revolution was an Islamic republic. Such an interpretation, which denies the existence and 
relevance of secular, leftist, nationalist movements and groups, has encountered the criticism 
of younger scholars. They have not only devoted their studies to the repressed, unofficial and 
dissenting movements, but also reclaimed their enduring influence on today’s activists and 
movements. According to them, the post Iran-Iraq war ‘democratic revival’ which saw the re-
emergence of a limited public sphere and the following ascendancy to executive power of 
Khatami and the reformists, was the demonstration of the effectiveness of such a historical 
legacy. In reaction to the ‘state-centered’ perspective, many scholars have proposed the idea 
of a ‘democratisation from below,’ the separation between society and the state, and focused 
on the democratising activities of the Iranian ‘civil society,’ an expression that became a real 
key-word in the field (Butel 1998, Khosrokhavar 2000,  Saghafi and Ehsani 1999, Kamali 
2001, Yaghmayan 2002). In this context, the terms of the debate and the objects of analysis 
have however been confused with wishful thinking and ideology. For instance, the idea that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘end of ideologies’ brought about a democratic era 
governed by the non-ideological imperatives of moderation and pragmatism was much 
supported; from this, followed the assumption that in such a new era, Iranian society became 
de-ideologised, disillusioned with the Islamist regime and therefore democratic (Saghafi 
2001, Khosrokhavar and Roy 1999, Sheikholeslami 2000). Furthermore, concepts such as 
‘democracy,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘modernity’ have often been used as one, or bounded together in 
a teleological, positivist relationship. As in much of the Middle Eastern Studies during the 
1990s and early 2000s, social sciences were dominated by what can be called a ‘transitology 
fever’ according to which the Islamic Republic was on the verge of democratisation given the 
presence of factors such as economic liberalisation, ‘civil society organisations,’ a de-
ideologised and reasonably large middle class and a moderate government. Furthermore, to 
give more substance to the claim about Iranians’ liberal bias, scholars argued that Iranians are 
more democratic and less religious than Arabs (Moaddel, Azadarmaki 2002; Moaddel 2009). 
As Khosrokhavar stated, ‘in terms of democratic social movements, the contrast between Iran 
and the Arab world is glaring. (…) In the Muslim world at large (…) democracy is supported 
neither by the government nor by any large scale social movement’ (49). Following from this 
black and white representation, is the assumed fact that in many Muslim countries there still 
is the belief in political Islam ‘as the ultimate political and social solution’ (49), whereas in 
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Iran ‘the Utopia of political Islam is dead for the overwhelming majority of the population’ 
(50).  
When presented in such fashion, the narration of Iranian history as a struggle from 
below for democracy, free civil society and human rights against state authoritarianism is 
very unproblematic and therefore questionable. This is not to deny the fact that political 
resistance, dissent and revolt have characterised the Iranian history: we all indeed know that 
where there is power, there is resistance. What is questionable here is the reading of 
resistance as a liberal project, aimed at establishing a poorly defined ‘democracy,’ which is 
the goal of almost any form of resistance at any point in time. It follows that there are 
significant issues with this normative and deterministic historical perspective, which often 
projects individual desires and beliefs rather than detached analyses of both the past and the 
present. First, it is not clear what it adds to our understanding of Iranian history and politics. 
The history of almost every nation in the world may be read as the people’s struggle for some 
objective such as national unity, freedom from colonialism, or the establishment of an 
independent, democratic government. From the point of view of historical scholarship, 
arguing that Iranian history is characterised by an unchanging pattern of ‘democratic 
resilience,’ a general paradigm applicable to any event at any point in time, is either a wishful 
thinking or an ideological statement. In this sense, the authors’ continuous reference to the 
Constitutional revolution and to this unchangeable historical pattern transcending the 
decades, sounds like the propagandistic use that politicians make of events of the past in 
order to legitimate today’s options by contextualising them in a normative, broader and 
national historical trajectory.  
Second, there is a problem with the definition of ‘democratic,’ which is often de-
linked from any historical context and to which an unchanging, positive meaning is often 
attached. It is interesting to note how the authors use today’s language and key-words in 
order to describe social and political dynamics that took place more than one hundred years 
ago, in very different international and domestic settings. This is the case also with ‘civil 
society’, which has become an all-encompassing concept often employed not to describe a 
concrete and precise phenomenon, but in order to allude to something symbolically and 
ideologically linked to positive democratic values. 
The third weakness of this understanding of Iranian history and social transformations 
is the dismissal of Islamism as a working and appealing political force. This is quite similar 
to the reaction that some scholars of the Arab world had when the Egyptian and Tunisian 
uprisings exploded. Olivier Roy, for instance, wrote that the revolts were dominated by a new 
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generation composed of individuals ‘not interested in ideology,’ who ‘do not invoke Islam 
like the older generation did in Algeria in the late 1980s’ (Roy 2011). Such a quick dismissal 
of Islamism as an effective ideology is in profound conflict with later events such as the 
electoral success of Islamists or the emersion of Salafist forces in Tunisia, Libya and Syria. In 
the case of Iran, many scholars argue that Iranian society is broadly secular, often 
overlooking the complexity of such a statement. Indeed, their analysis is sometimes based on 
questionable factors and thus questionable in its findings. In his chapter, for instance, 
Khosrokhavar argues that ‘large sections of the Iranian civil society have been secularized, 
due to internal evolution, the access of many young people to education, the influence of the 
Iranian Diaspora abroad (…) and Internet culture which has partially neutralized the 
ideological views propagated by the regime’ (60), or due to ‘mobile phones, satellite TV, 
YouTube, Twitter, Facebook’ (43). Despite maybe holding some degree of truth for 
particular social strata, such claims are based on sources that are only partially valid. For 
instance, such a secularisation is often linked to the emergence of the post-1989 democratic 
intellectual discourses of Soroush, Kadivar and other intellectuals (46). However their 
influence over the wider population beyond university students and activists is likely to be 
limited. Similarly, the growing mingling of sexes (45) cannot necessarily be cited as 
supporting the argument of secularization given the significance of class stratification and the 
internal cultural differences of the population. The rise of female education (45-46) also does 
not necessarily equate with gender emancipation and secularization, as demonstrated by Goli 
Rezai-Rashti (2011). Finally, the popularity of Gene Sharp’s The Politics of Non-Violent 
Action (57-58) should not be over-stated when one considers that the impact that this book 
has outside the very small community of activists in Iran might be severely limited.  
The prominence of secularism amongst the most debated issues in Iranian Studies is 
probably understandable because it offers a partial redemption from culturalist and neo-
orientalist views on Middle Eastern societies. Mirsepassi’s Political Islam, Iran and the 
Enlightenment partly follows this approach, as stated by the author himself, who aims  
 
‘to raise awareness among scholars by defining the ‘non-Islamic’ ideas that have 
been essential to the overall development of the Islamist ideology, disturbing at 
once the Islamist claim to local ‘authenticity’ as well as the too-common 
assumption in the West that these radical politics somehow represent a ‘natural’ or 
‘logical’ extension of Islamic religious or cultural history as such’ (5).  
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Mirsepassi’s core argument is that a significant part of the ideological body of Iranian 
Islamism is rooted in the West and in Western anti-Enlightenment intellectual tradition. 
Although part of this argument has already been documented elsewhere (Boroujerdi 1996), 
the volume goes further in examining the mutual influences among world civilisations that 
prepared such an exchange, removing Iran and Islamism from scientific insularity. The book 
opens with an examination of nativist and ‘localist’ reactions to modernity, reporting 
different examples from both Western and non-Western societies (21-66), and concludes with 
Mirsepassi’s own opinion on the possibility and strategy for reconciling religion and 
democracy with a progressive and pro-Enlightenment modernity. The volume is composed of 
an impressive review of a very broad body of literature: from Dewey to Roberspierre, from 
Heidegger to Putnam, the author offers an intellectually refined discussion of various theories 
he perfectly masters. All this is aimed to defend the progressive and liberal values that result 
from a democratic understanding of the Enlightenment and its modernist vocation. However, 
despite the merit of engaging a huge part of Western philosophy in a very fascinating manner, 
the book presents one main weakness being a passionate promotion of a political ideology, 
liberal democracy in this case, rather than a critical examination of it and an analysis of the 
appeal that criticism of liberal democracy may have in Iran for many social groups. The 
assumption here is that since 1979 Iranian society has changed to the point that criticism 
against some traits of the Islamic regime is equated with uncritical support for liberal 
democracy – an assumption which raises doubts. The last chapters of the book are devoted to 
promote a model of modernity which is informed by the Western historical experience and 
rests on the foundations of Western liberal democracy. Despite his call for a pluralist 
modernity, Mirsepassi explicitly states his preference is for the British-American pragmatic 
model (chapter six), which is considered as the best option for Iran. This is done without any 
element justifying such a claim, beyond the author’s clear preference for it.  
Generally speaking, recent studies on the topics of democratisation and social 
secularism in Iran have the merit of resting on very refined and elegant theoretical 
elaborations, but have the downside of being quite ideological in their premises. A further 
demonstration of this is the fact that we still do not have a scientific examination of the idea 
of democracy as understood and promoted by non-reformist intellectuals and theorists. 
Indeed, important transformations have taken place within the conservative and traditionalist 
elite as well, although often neglected in the scholarship. The 2009 crisis and the intense 
factional competition have caused the emergence of rifts and conflicts, which in some cases 
have been caused by diverging views on the room for and limits of dissent, within the 
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conservative and traditionalist elite in power. This is probably because, according to received 
wisdom, topics such as democracy are exclusive to reformists’ ideological system. 
Furthermore, given their growing prominence in Iran and more generally in the region, 
conservatives Islamists and their values would deserve more attention. 
 
A possible way out? 
In recent years, the issues of democracy, social discontent and progressive activism in 
Iran have received a great deal of attention and have been linked to the experience of 
Khatami’s reformist governments, whose political activities have been examined under the 
more general rubric of democratization studies. Güneş Tezcür’s volume, Muslim Reformers 
in Iran and Turkey is aimed at examining reformist political forces in Iran and Turkey, but 
the author does this in an original manner, avoiding many of the scholarly pitfalls described 
above. First, as far as the Iranian case is concerned, the author avoids approaching Khatami’s 
efforts of liberalization of the public sphere and political discourse through the lenses of 
democratisation studies. Instead, he approaches the reformist era through moderation theory. 
Building on Jillian Schwedler and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham’s studies on Islamists in 
Yemen, Jordan and Egypt, Tezcür’s main argument is that moderation can actually be an 
obstacle to democratisation rather than an incentive, contradicting what the moderation 
theory and democratisation studies posit. Second, Tezcür suggests that reformism and 
moderation can be analysed from a different perspective other than their supposedly 
pragmatic and anti-ideological nature. Furthermore, he refers to the ‘international dimension’ 
of reformism, meaning that reformist forces are normally more welcomed by the international 
community because they are considered as non-ideological and therefore more cooperative in 
the economic and diplomatic spheres than other factions (9-10). 
Despite the many positive aspects of Tezcür’s analysis, which brings to scholarly 
attention a number of useful theories usually neglected in Iranian Studies, the author misses a 
more general critique of what could be called the ‘ideology of reformism,’ or the preference 
for moderation over revolutionary and radical means of political struggle as an attitude 
informing scholarly claims and theoretical premises. An example of such an ideological 
approach can be found in Mirsepassi’s Democracy in Modern Iran. In the preface, the author 
states that ‘an important but poorly understood fact that needs to be emphasized is that 
Iranians historically prefer reform of existing political institutions to total change - this is 
why important figures in the modern history of Iran are known as ‘reformers’ (xiii), a claim 
which is tautological and hardly demonstrable with only the author’s perception as empirical 
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support. In her analysis of Ben Ali’s Tunisia, Béatrice Hibou (2009) demonstrated that 
‘reformism’ is an ideological tool which, in the 21st century, political forces refer to in order 
to gather domestic and international endorsement. Appealing to democracy has a similar 
legitimising effect, being something that almost any social or political actor has to refer to. 
The internationally dominant rhetoric of democracy, reformism, human rights and non-
violence frame the activists’ discourse and indicate them the right language to be spoken in 
order to reach an international audience. No surprise, then, that the Green Movement defines 
itself as non-violent, reformist, pro-human rights or democratic. Within this framework, the 
interpretation of Iranian history as a ‘quest for democracy and civil society’ and the 
normative, positive value attached to reformism and moderation look like assumptions 
informing an ideological manner of approaching these issues, ignoring the instrumental use 
that political actors can make of democratic ideals, moderation and their sometimes 
evanescent meaning. This does not mean denying the democratic nature of the Green 
Movement. It indicates rather that scholars should go beyond the activists’ self-representation 
and contextualize instead the experience of democratic struggles in a broader analytical 
setting, where the activists’ discourse does not answer all our scholarly queries. Tezcür’s 
book does not expand in this direction, but should be praised for its original review of a great 
deal of theories on political change that are sometimes overlooked by other scholars.  
 
Conclusion 
The overcoming of an ideological approach to the study of social conflicts and 
transformation in Iran is only possible through the disempowerment of the symbolic strength 
of concepts such as democracy or civil society, bringing them back to research and engaging 
the genealogy of their meaning and use (Foucault 1977). These four books do not operate in 
this direction, despite providing the academic community with fascinating readings. 
However, the most important element that these volumes paradoxically lead to is an urgent 
call for a discussion about the state of Iranian Studies, which would benefit from a serious 
engagement with social scientists from Arab Studies. Indeed, the ‘unfinished’ status of the 
Arab Spring may help some scholars of Iranian Studies to abandon their teleological 
analytical perspective, which individuates a predefined form of government, namely liberal 
democracy, as the goal of all social conflicts, elite factional transformations, and even the 
national history of Iran. 
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